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Turning from Damage Caps to Information Disclosure:  
An Alternative to Tort Reform 
Kathryn Zeiler, M.S., J.D., Ph.D.* 
 
With the 2004 U.S. presidential election close at hand, George W. 
Bush and his Administration resurrected a previously-killed federal 
proposal to cap medical malpractice damage awards.1 The Bush 
Administration once again claimed that the United States is experiencing a 
medical malpractice insurance crisis and that frivolous medical malpractice 
lawsuits are the cause of this crisis.2 According to the current 
Administration, large jury awards lead to significant increases in medical 
malpractice insurance premiums, driving physicians from the practice of 
medicine.3 Indeed, an array of policymakers continue to argue that 
 
        *  Associate Professor of Law and Co-director of the Law and Economics Workshop 
Series at Georgetown University Law Center. The author thanks Victor Fleisher and Mitu 
Gulati for helpful comments and Joshua Ellis and Denise Shiu for excellent research 
assistance. 
 1. In March 2003, the House passed the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely 
Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003). The House version of the 
proposed legislation caps punitive damages at twice the economic damages or at $250,000, 
whichever is greater, and limits attorney’s fees in contingency cases. In July 2003, the 
Patients First Act of 2003, S. 11, 108th Cong. (2003) was proposed and defeated. If passed, 
the legislation would have placed an award cap of $250,000 on non-economic damages and 
limited attorney’s fees in contingency cases. 
 2. In a recent speech Vice President Richard Cheney argued that 
Medical liability litigation is a serious problem in almost every state in the land, 
and it’s not getting any better. Frivolous lawsuits are clogging the courts, and 
delaying justice for those with real problems. . . . We must protect the rights of 
those with real grievances, and we have to fix the medical liability problem at its 
source—the frivolous lawsuits that are filed solely with the hope of winning 
massive verdicts. That is why President Bush has set forth some responsible, 
practical reforms to put doctors and patients back in charge of healthcare in 
America . . . . The President has proposed a reasonable federal cap of $250,000 
on non-economic damage awards . . . .  
Vice President Richard Cheney, Address to Dana Conference Center, Medical College of 
Ohio (July 19, 2004), http://www.georgewbush.com/HealthCare/Read.aspx?ID=3006. 
 3. Id. (quoting Cheney as arguing that “huge payoffs for personal injury trial lawyers” 
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damage caps will quell sharply increasing medical malpractice premiums, 
despite the fact that empirical evidence regarding the impact of damage 
caps on premiums is inconclusive.4 
This Case Study argues that imposing statutory caps on medical 
malpractice damages is not an effective method of remedying the medical 
malpractice insurance crisis; therefore, policymakers should consider 
alternatives to damage caps. In particular, evidence suggests that 
implementing mandatory disclosure of the contract terms between 
managed care organization (MCOs) and physicians for the provision of 
services to enrollees reduces medical malpractice insurance premiums. 
Part I of this Case Study reviews the controversy regarding the efficacy 
of damage caps in remedying medical malpractice insurance crises and 
discusses the state of empirical research investigating the effects of caps. 
Part II argues that a particular alternative—forcing disclosure of contract 
terms between MCOs and physicians—might more effectively reduce 
premiums. Policymakers interested in regulating medical malpractice 
insurance premiums should consider implementing MCO-physician 
contract disclosure requirements as a means to their desired end. 
I. A POPULAR “SOLUTION”: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DAMAGE CAPS 
Several policymakers have proposed imposing medical malpractice 
damage caps to solve the current perceived medical malpractice insurance 
crisis.5 The proposals have reinvigorated a long-standing debate as to 
whether damage caps, in fact, significantly reduce medical malpractice 
premiums. Section A provides a short summary of the debate. In Section B, 
I discuss an important component of the analysis that has been largely 
missing from the debate: the effects of caps on treatment choices. Finally, 
in Section C, I briefly analyze the body of empirical research designed to 
study the relationship between caps, litigation, and medical malpractice 
insurance premiums. 
 
and “massive increases in medical liability insurance premiums, for doctors across the 
country” have reached crisis proportions.) In the same address, Cheney claimed that 
imposing caps on damages would remedy the problem of increasing medical malpractice 
premiums. Id. 
 4. For a summary of the empirical literature studying the effects of damage caps on 
medical malpractice insurance premiums, see Kathryn Zeiler, An Empirical Study of the 
Effects of State Regulations on Medical Malpractice Litigation Decisions (July 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 5. See infra Section I.A. 
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A. The Controversy over Damage Caps 
Politicians and industry players claim that implementing medical 
malpractice damage caps will help end the medical malpractice insurance 
crisis. Recently, the media reported that “[damage] caps are being pushed 
nationally by Republicans including President Bush, who argue that 
excessive jury awards are largely responsible for escalating malpractice 
premiums.”6 The National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies 
(NAIC) supports medical malpractice caps on damages, arguing that caps 
would limit runaway jury awards of non-economic and punitive damages.7 
Insurers also argue that caps reduce uncertainty, making it easier for them 
to set insurance premiums.8 
On the other hand, opponents of damage caps argue that caps will not 
solve the medical malpractice crisis and that the cost of caps outweighs any 
potential benefits (if, indeed, they create benefits at all).9 Some 
commentators claim that caps are unconstitutional because they infringe 
on injured patients’ rights to trials by jury, to open courts, and to equal 
protection.10 Others note the potentially perverse effects of damage caps; 
for example, some claim that if caps are imposed, fewer legitimate medical 
malpractice cases might be filed because the costs of pursuing each claim 
might exceed expected awarded damages.11 In addition, empirical 
evidence suggests that caps might lead to larger jury awards in some cases 
 
 6. John Wagner, Doctors Wooed in Malpractice Insurance Fight, WASH. POST, July 26, 2004, 
at B1. 
 7. Nat’l Ass’n of Mutual Ins. Cos., Medical Malpractice Liability Reform, at 
http://www.namic.org/fedkey/04MedMal.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2004). 
 8. See W. Kip Viscusi, Tort Reform and Insurance Markets, 7 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 9, 20 
(2004). 
 9. See infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. 
 10. Ashley Stewart, Note, Texas’ House Bill Four’s Noneconomic Damage Caps Impose the 
Burden of Supporting the Medical Industry Solely upon the Most Severely Injured and Therefore Most 
in Need of Compensation, 57 SMU L. REV. 497, 503 (2004) (arguing also that damage caps 
“cause harm by preventing the most deserving victims from gaining compensation for their 
injuries”). 
 11. See ERIC NORDMAN ET AL., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE REPORT: A STUDY OF 
MARKET CONDITIONS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE RECENT CRISIS 47 (2004), 
http://www.naic.org/models_papers/papers/MMP-OP-04-EL.pdf (draft report presented 
to the NAIC’s Property and Casualty Committee July 14, 2004) (arguing that “[s]ince the 
costs of researching and arguing a medical malpractice case can be very large, awards 
available once caps are introduced may not, in some cases, cover even the costs associated 
with pursuing a claim.”); see also Rachel Zimmerman, As Malpractice Caps Spread, Lawyers 
Turn Away Some Cases, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2004, at A1. 
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because jurors might perceive the cap as the correct amount to award to all 
injured plaintiffs.12 Similar perceptions by negotiating parties can also skew 
settlement outcomes in unexpected ways.13 
Importantly, neither proponents nor opponents of caps have 
considered how caps might affect treatment choices made by physicians 
and managed care organizations and how these choices influence patient 
injury rates. In the following Section, I extend the boundaries of the 
debate by arguing that caps, at least theoretically, affect treatment choices, 
which in turn impact injury rates and medical malpractice claim rates. 
B. The Missing Component: The Influence of Damage Caps on Treatment Choices
14
 
While proponents of damage caps frequently argue that excessive 
litigation increases the practice of defensive medicine by physicians,15 
critics of caps might similarly assert that limits on damages may also 
adversely affect treatment decisions.16 An examination of how caps 
influence the behavior of a wider array of health care market actors reveals 
that they can produce perverse incentives at the treatment decision stage. 
 
 12. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: 
The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353 (1999). Of course, these 
results might be important only in regimes in which juries are informed of statutory 
damage caps prior to deliberating about damages. Currently, only courts in Massachusetts 
are required to instruct the jury that, if it finds the defendant liable, it may not (in most 
cases) award more than the statutory limit for non-economic damages.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (West Supp. 1995).  West Virginia allows the court to instruct the jury 
in this manner.  See W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (1994). 
 13. See Greg Pogarsky & Linda Babcock, Damage Caps, Motivated Anchoring, and 
Bargaining Impasse, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 143 (2001). 
 14. For a complete analysis of the effects of damage caps on treatment choices, see 
Zeiler, supra note 4 (presenting theoretical predictions regarding how damage caps affect 
medical malpractice claim rates).   
 15. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE 
CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS BY FIXING OUR MEDICAL 
LIABILITY SYSTEM 19 (July 2002) (arguing that “[t]he excesses of the litigation system are an 
important contributor to ‘defensive medicine’”). Defensive medicine refers to the practice 
of providing patients with an inefficient amount of medical care to avoid exposure to 
liability for medical practice. For example, a physician might order an excessive number of 
diagnostic tests to be sure that she meets the legal standard of care when treating a 
particular patient. For a discussion of defensive medicine, see CHARLES E. PHELPS, HEALTH 
ECONOMICS 442-45 (3d ed. 2003).  
 16. To the best of my knowledge, this has not been argued in the past by those who 
oppose caps on damages.  
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Consider, first, how damage caps might influence the decision of an 
injured patient (or her attorney who likely is employed by the patient on a 
contingency-fee basis) regarding whether to file a medical malpractice 
claim against her physician. Assume that a patient will file a claim only if 
expected damages exceed litigation costs.17 Estimates of expected damages 
depend on two variables: the anticipated damage award and the 
probability that the patient will succeed in recovering this amount from 
the physician. The probability of success (whether by court award or 
through settlement), in turn, depends on the likelihood that the physician 
provided non-compliant medical care. All other things being equal, as the 
likelihood that the physician provided non-compliant treatment increases, 
the probability of recovering damages increases, as does the probability 
that an injured patient will file a claim.18 
The next step in the analysis is to consider how caps affect the 
probability that a physician will provide non-compliant treatment. In 
theory, when deciding whether to provide costly compliant treatment, the 
physician (in conjunction with the patient’s MCO) weighs the costs and 
the benefits of providing such care.19 Costs refer to all the expenses 
incurred in providing compliant care; the benefits include the reduction 
in exposure to liability for medical malpractice. Damage caps reduce the 
exposure to liability; therefore, the imposition of caps makes it optimal, in 
some cases, for physicians (or MCOs) to face potential liability for medical 
malpractice rather than provide costly treatment that complies with the 
legal standard of care. Recent research does, in fact, indicate that 
 
 17. In other words, assume injured patients act perfectly rationally when deciding 
whether to sue for medical malpractice. Of course, in some cases, these decisions may be 
driven by factors other than the expected monetary costs and benefits of filing a claim (e.g., 
emotions, revenge and strategic behavior). However, since patients must convince lawyers 
to take on these cases in exchange for a cut of the pie, it is unlikely that filing decisions are 
driven significantly by emotional factors. In addition, physicians tend not to cave easily to 
patients’ demands based on nonmeritorious claims because they highly value their 
reputations (and would risk sanctions). See Linda Oberman, IG Asks Why More Hospitals Don’t 
Report Adverse Actions, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 13, 1995, at 4 (claiming that reputation effects, 
in part, drive physician reluctance to settle medical malpractice cases).  
 18. To obtain this result we need only assume that the court is better at verifying 
whether the physician provided negligent treatment than it would be if it flipped a fair coin.  
This assumption does not seem unreasonable.  
 19. For a detailed analysis of the physician’s treatment choice, see Kathryn Zeiler, 
Medical Malpractice and Contract Disclosure: An Equilibrium Model of the Effects of Legal 
Rules on Behavior in Health Care Markets 16-18 (Apr. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author). 
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physicians react to different sorts of financial incentives in this way.20 
To summarize, if damage caps reduce exposure to liability, physicians 
(and MCOs), on average, may be less likely to provide compliant 
treatment. This will result in an increase in patient injuries, and in turn, an 
increase in the number of injured patients who file claims for medical 
malpractice. 21 
This increase in the claims rate, coupled with the potential decrease in 
the average damage award (and settlements) due to the cap, is likely to 
yield indeterminacy: Because of these competing forces the influence of 
caps on ex ante calculations of expected damages from medical 
malpractice claims (and therefore medical malpractice insurance 
premiums) will depend on other variables, such as the cost of treatment 
relative to expected damages, the probabilities of injuries given compliant 
and non-compliant treatment, and the amount of the cap.22 Therefore, the 
claim that caps will decrease medical malpractice insurance premiums is 
arguably shortsighted because it does not account for the influence of caps 
on influence treatment choices. 
 
 20. While the effects of tort reform on treatment choices have not been studied 
empirically to date, some have investigated the effects of financial incentives on treatment 
choices and find that physicians do respond to financial incentives. See, e.g., Thomas S. 
Crane, The Problem of Physician Self-Referral Under the Medicare and Medicaid Antikickback Statute, 
268 JAMA 85, 86 (1992) (citing government studies indicating that physicians respond to 
financial incentives in their treatment practices); David Hemenway et al., Physicians’ 
Responses to Financial Incentives: Evidence from a For-Profit Ambulatory Care Center, 322 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1059, 1062 (1990) (showing that physicians react to bonus arrangements that reward 
them for ordering laboratory tests by significantly increasing the number of tests they 
order). In addition, studies have found that physicians who report that their contracts with 
MCOs include incentives to reduce referrals were “more likely than others to have felt 
pressure to limit referrals in a manner that compromised care.” See Kevin Grumbach et al., 
Primary Care Physicians’ Experience of Financial Incentives in Managed-Care Systems, 339 NEW 
ENG. J.  MED. 1516 (1998). 
 21. It is important to note that physician exposure to liability likely will influence MCO 
behavior.  If the costs of practicing medicine increase due to increased exposure liability, 
then physicians will demand more in compensation from MCOs.  MCOs can influence 
physician treatment choices directly by approving or denying reimbursement for treatments 
and indirectly through financial incentives written into MCO-physician contracts.  
Therefore, changes in physicians’ exposure to liability will influence MCO-physician 
contracts and MCO decisions regarding whether to approve particular treatments. 
 22. See Zeiler, supra note 4, for a complete characterization of the equilibria under 
various conditions. Despite the indeterminacy, “unless the cap is so restrictive that total 
damages fall below litigation costs, caps are likely to cause an increase in ex ante expected 
damages.” Id. at 13. 
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With a more complete understanding of how damage caps might 
influence the choices of health care market actors, we are positioned to 
evaluate the empirical results, produced using field data, to study the 
effects of caps on medical malpractice insurance and litigation behavior. 
The following Section summarizes the state of the empirical literature and 
argues that the cumulative findings do not allow us to draw conclusions 
regarding how damage caps influence medical malpractice insurance 
markets or litigation behavior. 
C. Empirical Evidence 
Several researchers have employed field data to investigate whether 
caps significantly influence medical malpractice insurance premiums and 
losses incurred by insurers.23 A review of this empirical literature reveals 
two general themes. First, the empirical results generally are mixed. 
Second, given the difficulties in directly measuring the influence of caps, 
reliance on the results of most studies is controversial. 
Results vary significantly depending on the data employed, the 
specifications of the empirical models, and the time periods studied. For 
example, Professor Frank Sloan investigated the influence of damage caps 
on premiums paid by physicians in three specific fields.24 The study 
incorporated data for the years 1974-1978. Using regression analysis, he 
found that damage caps significantly affected neither premiums nor 
annual percentage change in premiums for any of the three fields tested. 
Professor Kip Viscusi and his colleagues focused mainly on the effects of 
the second generation of tort reforms to be implemented by state 
legislators.25 Using 1988 aggregated premiums by state, they considered the 
change in premiums from 1985 to 1987. The analysis controlled for 
differences in state regulation of insurers. The authors considered limits 
on non-economic damages and limits on punitive damages and, like Frank, 
found that limits on non-economic damages did not significantly affect 
premiums. 
Conversely, Stephen Zuckerman of the Urban Institute and his 
 
 23. See Zeiler, supra note 4 (reviewing the empirical literature). 
 24. Frank A. Sloan, State Responses to the Malpractice Insurance “Crisis” of the 1970s: An 
Empirical Assessment, 9 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 629, 637-643 (1985). 
 25. See, e.g., W. K. Viscusi et al., The Effect of 1980s Tort Reform Legislation on General 
Liability and Medical Malpractice Insurance, 6 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 165, 186 (1993) 
(analyzing the effects of reforms such as modifications of joint and several liability, limits on 
liability and establishments of immunities, limits on noneconomic and punitive damages 
and provisions for structured and periodic payments of damage awards). 
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colleagues found that damage caps significantly reduced medical 
malpractice insurance premiums.26 The study uses data covering a thirteen-
year period—1974 through 1986—and including data for most states. 
Likewise, Professor Vasanthakumar Bhat examined the influence of 
damage caps on several indicators including claim rates, severity of claims, 
and premiums.27 Using data on the payment rate per physician of each 
state for the period 1991-1995, Bhat found that caps on economic and 
non-economic damages, taken together, significantly decreased premiums. 
However, similar to the results of some others, Bhat found that caps on 
non-economic damages, considered alone, had no effect on premium 
levels. 
These mixed empirical results are most likely due to the difficulties in 
measuring the influence of caps on medical malpractice insurance and 
litigation.28 These difficulties arise for a variety of reasons. First, isolating 
the effects of caps in the presence of other sorts of tort reform is 
complicated. Second, the uncertainty generated by legal challenges 
claiming, for example, that reforms are unconstitutional makes it difficult 
to measure the direct effect of caps on insurance and litigation.29 Third, 
the availability of data is limited and the data that is available presents 
challenges in the design of empirical studies. For instance, data on actual 
losses paid aggregated by state are generally unavailable, although some 
researchers have obtained data of this sort directly from insurers.30 
Furthermore, using proxies for losses paid (e.g., losses incurred) presents 
additional concerns, including the danger that accounting adjustments 
might substantially reduce the correlation between losses paid and the 
proxy.31 Specifically, the managers of insurance companies have incentives 
 
 26. Stephen Zuckerman et al., Effects of Tort Reforms and Other Factors on Medical 
Malpractice Insurance Premiums, 27 INQUIRY 167 (1990). 
 27. VASANTHAKUMAR N. BHAT, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS 
(2001). 
 28. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES 
(June 2004) (discussing the difficulties in evaluating the results of the empirical studies on 
the factors discussed in this Section of the Case Study). 
 29. See Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort 
Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567, 1568 n.4 (1997) (discussing cases in which tort reforms 
have been held unconstitutional on theories of violation of equal protection, violation of 
right to court access and violations of rights to due process). 
 30. See Albert Yoon, Damage Caps and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Medical 
Malpractice Litigation in the South, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 199, 209 (2001). 
 31. See Zeiler, supra note 4 (analyzing data on losses incurred gathered by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners). Of 550 observations of state-level losses incurred 
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to manipulate the reserves to manage the bottom lines of their companies. 
Thus, if we observe lower incurred losses in regimes which cap damages, 
this may not reflect the true effects of the caps, but rather the effects of 
earnings manipulations that might be unrelated to manager expectations 
regarding future losses. In fact, managers might use the fact that damage 
caps are in place to justify decreasing reserves. Finally, as cogently 
explained by Professor Albert Yoon, employing simple regressions to study 
the effects of damage caps on medical malpractice insurance premiums 
can be problematic if the implementation of caps is endogenous to 
perceived market conditions related to premiums. In other words, if caps 
are implemented in response to rising medical malpractice insurance 
premiums, then it becomes difficult to measure the influence of the caps 
on premiums.32 This problem is referred to as endogeneity33 
In a recent study, Yoon demonstrated empirical modeling techniques 
that can be used in the face of potential endogeneity.34 By using a 
difference-in-difference approach, Yoon was able to account for conditions 
present before and after the implementation and repeal of damage caps. 
Employing this technique and others to control for various additional 
modeling concerns, Yoon found that caps decreased the average relative 
recovery by medical malpractice claimants. This study offers an important 
step toward determining the actual effects of caps on insurance and 
litigation. The results, however, do not allow us to make claims about 
whether total losses paid out to claimants increase or decrease when caps 
are imposed because the results do not provide insights into how caps 
 
(fifty states over eleven years), thirteen observations are negative. Id. This suggests that 
adjustments to reserves might swamp losses incurred and reduce the correlation between 
losses incurred and losses paid. See also Patient Access Crisis: The Role of Medical Litigation, 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2-3 (2003) (statement of Jay Angoff, Counsel, 
Roger G. Brown & Associates) (reporting testimony describing insurance company 
manager incentives to inflate or understate estimates of losses incurred). 
 32. See Yoon, supra note 30, at 202 (arguing that if “the policy is a codification of 
underlying conditions . . . that actually caused the policy to be implemented in the first 
place,” then determining the causal connection between the implementation of caps and 
indicators, such as losses, becomes difficult). 
 33. For an explanation of the problems resulting from endogeneity, see STEPHEN J. 
SCHMIDT, ECONOMETRICS 263-81 (2004). See also HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL 
METHODS FOR LAWYERS 565-566 (2003) (illustrating endogeneity, which they refer to as “two-
way causation,” by pointing out that it is difficult to understand the influence of increasing 
the number of police on crime rates because more police tend to be sent to particular 
areas: namely, those with high crime rates).  
 34. See Yoon, supra note 32, at 203.  
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influence the number of patient injuries and the number of claims filed. If 
caps result in an increase in the number of claims filed, then despite the 
fact that average recoveries decrease, caps could increase the total losses 
paid. 
Despite the fervent push to implement damage caps as a solution to 
the medical malpractice insurance crisis, 35 more research clearly is needed 
to determine how caps and other sorts of tort reform actually affect 
behavior in health care markets. Not only is more empirical research 
necessary, but also it is important that the empirical research be grounded 
in sound theoretical models of the effects of tort reform on behavior in 
health care markets. In the meantime, turning our attention to other 
possible remedies might prove useful. Part II presents an alternative 
remedy yet to be addressed by policymakers.   
II. AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY: MANDATORY CONTRACT DISCLOSURE 
As of 2001, twenty-one states required MCOs to disclose to their 
enrollees or prospective enrollees the terms of their contracts with 
physicians.36 While the goal of forcing contract disclosure is simply to 
provide information to consumers during the health plan selection 
process,37 evidence suggests that disclosure of contract terms might result 
in lower medical malpractice insurance premiums. 
The relationship between contract disclosure and medical malpractice 
insurance premiums is not intuitive. To understand the relationship, one 
must consider how the revelation of MCO-physician contract terms 
influences two types of decisions: litigation decisions made by injured 
patients and contract decisions made by MCOs.38 
First, consider how contract disclosures affect whether an injured 
patient pursues a medical malpractice claim against her physician. As 
discussed above, patients considering whether to file a medical malpractice 
 
 35. See supra Section I.A.  
 36. For a list of states that force disclosure of contracts between MCOs and physicians, 
see Zeiler, supra note 4. 
 37. Cf. William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American 
Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1825 (1999). 
 38. For a more complete game-theoretic analysis of the influence of mandatory contract 
disclosure rules on MCO-physician contracts, compliant treatment rates and medical 
malpractice litigation rates, see Zeiler, supra note 19; see also, Kathryn Zeiler, Medical 
Malpractice and Contract Disclosure: An Equilibrium Model of the Effects of Legal Rules 
on Behavior in Health Care Markets (Apr. 2004) (Working Paper presented to the Am. L. & 
Econ. Ass’n Annual Meeting, 2004).   
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claim frequently must do so under conditions of imperfect information. 
The injured patient is not always able to observe whether her injury was 
truly caused by negligent behavior on the part of her physician.39 Injured 
patients (and their attorneys) benefit from information that helps to 
resolve this uncertainty when deciding whether to pursue costly litigation.40 
MCO-physician contract terms are just this sort of information. In 
theory, injured patients should be able to update their prior beliefs about 
whether the physician acted negligently by considering the contract terms. 
For example, if the patient observes that the MCO and the physician 
agreed to a traditional fee-for-service arrangement (i.e., the physician is 
reimbursed a fee by the MCO for each particular medical service 
provided), then the injured patient might be more likely to believe that 
expensive compliant treatment was provided than if the MCO and 
physician agreed to a capitated arrangement (i.e., the MCO pays the 
physician a fixed dollar amount per patient per month and the physician 
pays for overruns out of his own pocket). 41  
Still, how does a change in the way potential litigants make decisions 
about whether to file claims lead to lower medical malpractice insurance 
premiums? The next step in the analysis is to consider how behavior at the 
litigation stage affects contract choices. MCOs design physician contracts 
to provide incentives for physicians to choose treatments that maximize 
MCO profits. In regimes that force contract disclosure, MCOs must 
consider not only how the contract terms shape physician treatment 
decisions, but also how the contract terms will influence litigation 
decisions by injured patients. By observing disclosed contract terms, 
patients are able to update their beliefs about the likelihood that they 
 
 39. Whether the patient is able to infer that the injury was caused by the negligent 
actions of the physician or MCO depends on two probabilities: the probability that non-
negligent treatment results in injury and the probability that negligent treatment results in 
injury. If these probabilities fall somewhere between zero and one, but are not equal to zero 
or one, then the patient will be uncertain about whether the injury resulted from negligent 
treatment. These probabilities, of course, will differ from case to case and will depend on 
the nature of the treatment, the characteristics of the patient and other such factors. See 
Zeiler, supra note 14. 
 40. This general concept is not novel: When principals are not able to observe behavior, 
they often turn to other sources of information, such as the number of hours the agent 
worked or whether the agent seemed intoxicated. See EDWARD P. LAZEAR, PERSONNEL 
ECONOMICS (1995).  
 41. See Zeiler, supra note 19, at 21-29 (predicting the manner in which MCOs will 
employ various contract types to influence physician behavior given a particular legal 
regime). 
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received compliant treatment. In fact, MCOs benefit from disclosing 
because they can use disclosures to signal the provision of compliant 
treatment and potentially reduce the number of claims filed.42 In other 
words, when injured patients receive the signal that compliant treatment 
was provided, they are less likely to file a costly medical malpractice claim 
because the likelihood of succeeding is low. Therefore, when patients can 
observe contract terms it is more likely that the MCO, when comparing the 
cost of compliant treatment to the expected damage award, will find it 
optimal to employ particular contract terms to encourage the physician to 
provide compliant treatment.  This is because, in those cases, the cost of 
providing the level of compliant treatment necessary to ensure that very 
few medical malpractice claims are filed is less than the reduction in 
exposure to liability that results from the increase in the provision of 
compliant treatment. 43   As a result, in regimes that mandate contract 
disclosure, MCOs are more likely to use contract terms that encourage 
physicians to provide compliant treatment and patients are less likely to file 
medical malpractice claims. 44  
Initial empirical tests of the theoretical predictions regarding how 
mandatory contract disclosure rules affect medical malpractice insurance 
premiums support claims that disclosure rules decrease ex ante expected 
damages arising from medical malpractice claims. A study using data on 
medical malpractice insurance premiums per physician in the fifty U.S. 
 
 42. That we do not observe MCOs voluntarily disclosing physician contract terms is 
most likely due to the fact that disclosure of this information is costly. Not only is the 
disclosure itself costly to produce, but an MCO might lose its competitive advantage if it 
discloses information about innovative contract terms that create efficiencies not enjoyed by 
competing MCOs. See Zeiler, supra note 4, at 28-29. In addition, that we do not observe 
consumers demanding disclosure of contractual arrangements might be due to market 
failures. See Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in Economies with Imperfect 
Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 Q. J. ECON. 229 (1986). Market failures abound in 
health care insurance markets. In particular, given that a substantial number of consumers 
obtain their health insurance through their employers, most consumers of health insurance 
are not involved in the bargaining process. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH 
BENEFITS 2004 ANNUAL SURVEY (2004), http://www.kff.org/insurance/7148/summary/ 
index.cfm (reporting that “[e]mployer-sponsored health insurance reaches more than 
three out of every five nonelderly Americans”). In addition, employers’ interests are not 
necessarily aligned with the interests of their employees. 
 43. See Zeiler, supra note 19, at 21-31 for a detailed explanation of this result.   
 44. For a complete analysis of how mandatory contract disclosure rules lead to more 
compliant treatment and less litigation, see Zeiler, supra note 19, at 29-31 for a detailed 
explanation of this result.   
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states for the period 1991-2001 provides some support for the prediction 
that mandatory disclosure rules decrease ex ante expected damages from 
medical malpractice claims.45 The empirical results indicate that medical 
malpractice insurance premiums are lower in states that force disclosure of 
contract terms.  
Mandatory disclosure has some potential drawbacks as well. For 
example, by forcing MCOs to disclose information about physician 
contracts they are, in essence, forced to reveal trade secrets.46 Innovative 
physician contracts arguably afford MCOs the opportunity to obtain an 
advantage over competitors. This benefit provides an incentive for MCOs 
to design creative, efficient physician contracts, an endeavor advantageous 
not only for the MCO but also for enrollees who enjoy lower prices and/or 
higher quality. Forcing MCOs to disclose information about these 
contracts might diminish the incentive to expend resources to develop 
innovative physician contracts. It is important to weigh these disadvantages 
against the benefits gained or consider ways to work around them before 
implementing such policies. 
CONCLUSION 
This Case Study focuses on the “best way” to address or improve the 
current state of malpractice insurance. Given the complexity of the 
industry, the solution likely will be complex itself, as it must address 
 
 45. See Zeiler, supra note 4, at 19-22, 24-26 (reporting regression results indicating that, 
under reasonable specifications, mandatory contract disclosure leads to lower medical 
malpractice insurance premiums). The effect of mandatory disclosure rules, however, 
becomes statistically insignificant when assuming (1) that a lag exists between the time 
statutes are passed and insurance rates reflect the new rule and (2) that current year 
premiums depend on prior year premiums.  Id. At 24-26.  While these empirical results 
provide some support for the theoretical prediction that mandatory disclosure rules lead to 
lower medical malpractice insurance premiums, it is important to note that these are 
preliminary findings.  Further investigation is required before we can recommend policy 
prescriptions. 
 46. HMOs have argued that required disclosure of physician contracts is unfair because 
the contracts are trade secrets. They claim that contracts are the result of much time and 
effort spent negotiating with physicians, and forced disclosure will allow competitors to 
unfairly take advantage of the end product without contributing to the costs. See 
Wilmington Star-News v. New Hanover Reg’l Med. Ctr., 480 S.E.2d 53, 56 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1997) (discussing whether pricing information in HMO contracts constitutes a trade 
secret). Forcing disclosure of physician incentives might create an economic disincentive to 
expend resources constructing innovative incentive arrangements. It is important to 
consider this when evaluating whether mandatory disclosure is socially optimal. 
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information asymmetries, agency problems, the negative effects of adverse 
selection, and various other market imperfections resulting from the 
structure of health care markets. Likely, no one remedy will be a panacea. 
In addition, seemingly intuitive remedies often produce unintended, 
perverse effects. 
The main point of this Case Study is to argue that damage caps, while 
a seemingly intuitive fix, might not be the cure-all touted by politicians and 
industry actors. Deeper analyses of the effects of caps reveal that they 
might affect health care markets in ways that make matters worse. In 
addition, given the nature of the inquiry and inherent methodological 
problems, we cannot draw strong conclusions from the body of empirical 
studies that investigate the effect of caps on medical malpractice insurance 
premiums. 
Given these difficulties, we should focus on alternatives to damage 
caps. One such alternative—mandating disclosure of MCO-physician 
contract terms—appears promising. An analysis considering how the 
market will react to the mandate indicates that forcing disclosure will lead 
to lower medical malpractice insurance premiums. Preliminary empirical 
evidence suggests that it is worthwhile to explore this remedy further.  
Patchwork remedies and politically-driven policies likely will not 
ameliorate the negative consequences of health care market imperfections. 
If we have any hope of structuring and regulating health care markets so as 
to reduce the probability of experiencing various sorts of crises, we must 
step back and take a comprehensive look at how market actors will adjust 
to regulations and how various regulations interact with one another. 
 
